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Latest post Wed, Jan 11 2006 4:53 PM by Sextus. 1 replies.
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Sextus  +  181359 Wed, 11 Jan 06 03:26 AM
1) "Likewise, in the third book of PH, S. explicitly states that the Pyrrhonist suspends judgment about whether anything is by nature good or bad. This is a further element that should prevent us from attributing to him the belief that ajtaraxiva and tarachv are by nature good and bad respectively. Note that PH iii 235 precedes the passage from PH iii 238 quoted above, in which the state of perturbation and the holding of beliefs are said to be bad. One may explain this apparent contradiction by saying that in this latter passage S. is arguing dialectically, that is, using the Dogmatists’ own premises to draw certain conclusions that they reject but are obliged to accept. One may likewise suppose that this is what S. is doing in many of the passages where he seems to be espousing dogmatic views."

2) "There S. observes that that which each person regards as good is that which appears so to himself, and that that which appears good to each person is not so by nature. Hence, when one refrains from affirming that one’s personal goods are good by nature, one is not left with real relative goods, but only with one’s own appearances of value.

3) "In Sextus’ other writings one finds the Skeptic’s distinctive agnostic attitude coexisting with negative conclusions, just as in AD v one finds the claim that he who suspends judgment about everything is unperturbed and happy coexisting with the negative claims made in the passages referred to above. In neither case is it easy to determine how such views could fit together. One obvious solution is to claim that, in the texts in which Sextus seems to be arguing for negative dogmatic positions, the argumentation is dialectical. Another possible solution consists in interpreting those texts in the light of the caveats S. sometimes issues. On some occasions he explicitly points out that, when he advances arguments yielding negative conclusions, his intention is not to induce us to give our assent to them. Rather, he wants to show that such arguments appear to be equal in force to their rivals, so that we will have to suspend judgment about the truth of the theses that those conflicting arguments purport to establish."

Thanks,

Sextus
Joined on Sat, Nov 6 2004
Buenos Aires
Regular Member 731
Sextus  +  181644 Wed, 11 Jan 06 04:53 PM
I add another couple (if I may):
 
1) "In my view, that passage shows (a) that S. is aware that a person’s choice of a particular end is conditioned by circumstantial factors, and (b) that he thinks that, if ataraxia ceased to appear to the Skeptics as their most valuable personal good on account of the influence of those factors, this would not represent the loss of one of the defining features of their outlook."

I'm not sure about "ceased to".

2) "However, it seems plain that, in the passages in question, S. is advancing certain arguments only because they allow him to oppose the Epicurean position and reach isostheneia."

Thanks,

Sextus
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