Search results for 'tag:Direct questions tag:Numbers' matching tags 'Direct questions' and 'Numbers'

confused about 'would'

New2grammar — Fri, 29 Feb 2008 08:10:33 GMT

I know 'would' carries many meanings. My problem is sometimes I find it difficult to tell which meaning the speaker uses. I think I understand its hypothetical usage, and in some contexts, its politeness usage. Below is a post that has several woulds I have trouble interpreting. I also copied a post on would by CalifJim for reference.

Your analysis is good. Context will determine if you're using the expression as an excuse to break off what you're doing. If you're calling the people you expect to meet, then you would (1)tell them the truth. You can say, "I'll be about five minutes late," or "I may be a little late." If you're speaking to someone who is about to make you late for an appointment, the expression would(2) mean, "Hey, I'm gonna be late if I don't split right now!" If you just say, "I'm gonna be late," you probably would(3) have already tipped the person off that you would(4) need to end the conversation soon, and as you suggest, you would(5) still expect to be on time if you left immediately.

1) I don't thing politeness is the intended meaning here. To my ear, it carries the meaning of preference.

2) would here means possible? I have zero confidence in this one.

3) it doesn't look like hypothetical usage to me because the if clause is in present tense

4) and 5) should follow the same reasoning for #3, whatever that is.

Please help! Thanks in advance!

CalifJim's explanation on would
Yes. I thought maybe that's what you were referring to.
would in an if clause is possible when the would or the entire if-clause is part of a formula of politeness. if you would be so kind is a typical example of if with would in a "politeness phrase". This formula is equivalent to please. This sort of if-clause does not even have to be classified as a true conditional even though it contains the word if.

The phrase would like as a polite way of saying want, and it too can appear in an if-clause. Note that the idiom would like counts as a present tense for purposes of tense combinations. That is, it may combine with the imperative or the future. The idiom would rather has the same property.

If you would like to have dinner with us tomorrow, please call and let us know before noon.
I'm sure that if he'd like to go with us, he'll tell us. (If he would like to go, he will tell us.)
If you'd rather wait until tomorrow, [just say so / I'll understand].

if-clauses that are part of an indirect question structure are also exempt from the rule about combining if and would:

I wonder if he would object to this procedure.
I don't know if I would agree.
We had not decided if we would go along with the plan.

With the exception of the indirect question structure, which is quite common, these are just a very, very small number of situations where if and would occur in the same clause. The main rule for 99.99% of cases is 'never' to place if and would together!

Re: Law subject essay

julielai — Sat, 08 Sep 2007 16:34:08 GMT

I've highlighted things you need to fix.

Alexgn wrote:
I update my essay.

http://picccs.mine.nu/pics/essay.htm

=====================================================================================

~~In my opinion,~~ the major issues in this case are terms and conditions of agreement between the two parties and misrepresentation (of what). Therefore, ~~the discussion in~~ this essay will be focused on terms and conditions of the agreement and possible misrepresentation which might have occurred during the negation between the two parties.

The main arguments for Banjoâs case is that of the term of the agreement to deliver a rare and expensive Graham car manufactured in the 1930âs which Banjo described in the brochure. And ~~that~~ the term has been misrepresented by Hick during negotiation.

The contract between the parties was negotiated in writing (You mean they write letters to each other or something?). Therefore, the parol evidence rule applies: ~~which states that~~ if there is a record embodied in a document, the extrinsic evidence is not generally admissible.

Mercantile Bank of Sydney v Taylor (1891) 12 LR (NSW) 252

To determine if a statement has become a term of the contract in the course of negotiations, it is necessary to determine if the parties intended the statement to become the term of the contract. The courts have developed a number of subrules (do you mean guidelines?) that ~~assist in determination of~~  determine that intention. Among these are:

- Was the statement followed by a reduction of the terms to writing and, if so, was the statement included?

- Did one party have special knowledge or skill on which the other was entitled to rely?

- How important was the statement in the minds of the parties? Graw (2002 p. 200)

Banjo prepared a brochure in which he described the car required for the film (film or firm?).

The brochure was enclosed with the letter Banjo sent to Hick stating: âI will be happy to buy your Graham car provided it is appropriate for our film which is described in the enclosed brochure.â

Nemeth v Bayswater Road Pty Ltd [1988] 2 Qd R 406

It is also clear from the facts that Hick possessed greater knowledge about the Graham car he was offering for sale. Hick was the owner of the car and Banjo relied on his knowledge about the car.

Dick Bentley Productions Ltd v Harold Smith Motors Ltd [1965] 1 WLR 623

Furthermore, it can be argued that a reasonable person in Hickâs position should have become aware of the fact that it was very important for Banjo to buy a rare, expensive Graham car manufactured in 1930s for the film that was described in the brochure he provided to Hick.

Bannerman v White (1861) 10 CB (NS) 844; 142 ER 685

Given these arguments, in my opinion, the written statements Banjo made in his letters became the terms of the contract.

There is a fine ~~dividing~~ line between âmere representationâ on one hand and a representation of fact on the other. Only when it is proved that the representation of fact is not true, Banjo can rescind the contract. To prove that the representation of fact is not true Banjo will need to prove four things:

-         That false statement was made;

-         That the statement was one of fact

-         That it was addressed to the party misled (before or at the time the contract was made);

-         That it was intended to induce and did actually induce the contract. Graw (2002 p. 274)

Hick sent Banjo a photograph with a note stating: âthis shows you the excellent condition of my car.â Hick was silent about that fact that the car was not an âexpensiveâ model which Banjo asked for in his advertisement and probably (he either did or didn't describe it) described in details in the brochure. Generally, silence does not constitute misrepresentation; however, there are three fundamental exceptions to this presumption:

-         Half truths;

-         Statements which become false;

-         Contracts uberrimae fidei. Graw (2002 p. 275)

The statement that does not present the whole truth may be regarded as misrepresentation. ~~In my opinion,~~ during the negotiations, Hick misleadingly told Banjo part of the truth. Banjo can argue before the court that he was misled by the information which was not fully disclosed by Hick, and therefore the false statement was made on Hickâs part.

With v OâFlanagan [1936] Ch 575

R v Kylsant [1932] 1 KB 442

Furthermore, silence can also constitute misleading or deceptive conduct under s 52 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)

Henjo Investment Pty Ltd v Collins Marrickville Pty Ltd (1988) 79 ALR 83

The statement which Hick did not fully disclose was addressed to Banjo. And the statement Hick made was the statement of fact.

In addition, Banjo must show that Hickâs statement was intended to induce and successfully induced him in entering the agreement with Hick.

Redgrave v Hurd (1881) 20 Ch D 1

Given the facts, it is clear ~~to me~~ that Banjo relied on Hickâs information and that Hickâs statement was material to the contract. There were no additional information provided during the negotiations by other parties, and there were no extrinsic factors which influenced Banjoâs decision ~~to enter the contract~~. Banjo was influenced, and a reasonable person in Banjoâs position would have been influenced by Hickâs statements. In providing this information, Hick induced Banjo to enter the agreement.

Holmes v Jones (1907) 4 CLR 1692

Attwood v Small (1838) 6 CI & F 232

The argument in Hickâs defence is that he did not make a false statement about the car he was selling, and it was Banjo who was negligent to check the car before the contract was settled. Furthermore, Hick can argue that when he sent a photograph of his car to Banjo stating: âthis shows you the excellent condition of my carâ â that was a mere representation to influence on Banjo decision which occurs in regular dealings between the traders and the customers.

Dimmock v Hallett (1866) LR 2 Ch App 21

Hickâs statement was never meant to be binding. Therefore, his statement was not intended to be the term of the contract. In addition, Hick was not obliged to provide any further information about the car he was selling. Silence to any direct questions generally is not regarded as misrepresentation by courts.

Smith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597

In my opinion, Banjo has stronger arguments which show that the terms of the contract were misrepresented by Hick. Therefore, Banjo is entitled to rescind the contract.

References

Graw, S 2002 An Introduction to the Law of Contract, Lawbook Co, Sydney

Moles, Robert N 2006 Contract Law, Networked Knowledge, viewed on 21 August 2007 http://netk.net.au/ContractLaw.asp

Sawon, K 2007 LAWS 5009 â Commercial and Corporations LAW M (12980) Study Guide, City West Campus UniSA

Re: Law subject essay

Alexgn — Sat, 25 Aug 2007 21:27:41 GMT

I update my essay.

http://picccs.mine.nu/pics/essay.htm

=====================================================================================

In my opinion, the major issues in this case are terms and conditions of agreement between the two parties and misrepresentation. Therefore, the discussion in this essay will be focused on terms and conditions of the agreement and possible misrepresentation which might have occurred during the negation between the two parties.

The main arguments for Banjoâs case is that of the term of the agreement to deliver a rare and expensive Graham car manufactured in 1930âs which Banjo described in the brochure. And that the term has been misrepresented by Hick during negotiation.

The contract between the parties was negotiated in writing. Therefore, the parol evidence rule applies which states that if there is a record embodied in a document, the extrinsic evidence is not generally admissible.

Mercantile Bank of Sydney v Taylor (1891) 12 LR (NSW) 252

To determine if a statement has become a term of the contract in the course of negotiations, it is necessary to determine if the parties intended the statement to become the term of the contract. The courts developed a number of subrules that assist in determination of that intention. Among these are:

- Was the statement followed by a reduction of the terms to writing and, if so, was the statement included?

- Did one party have special knowledge or skill on which the other was entitled to rely?

- How important was the statement in the minds of the parties? Graw (2002 p. 200)

Banjo prepared a brochure in which he described the car required for the film.

The brochure was enclosed with the letter Banjo sent to Hick stating: âI will be happy to buy your Graham car provided it is appropriate for our film which is described in the enclosed brochure.â

Nemeth v Bayswater Road Pty Ltd [1988] 2 Qd R 406

It is also clear from the facts that Hick possessed greater knowledge about the Graham car he was offering for sale. Hick was the owner of the car and Banjo relied on his knowledge about the car.

Dick Bentley Productions Ltd v Harold Smith Motors Ltd [1965] 1 WLR 623

Furthermore, it can be argued that a reasonable person in Hickâs position should have become aware of the fact that it was very important for Banjo to buy a rare, expensive Graham car manufactured in 1930s for the film that was described in the brochure he provided to Hick.

Bannerman v White (1861) 10 CB (NS) 844; 142 ER 685

Given these arguments, in my opinion, the written statements Banjo made in his letters became the terms of the contract.

There is a fine dividing line between âmere representationâ on one hand and a representation of fact on the other. Only when it is proved that the representation of fact is not true, Banjo can rescind the contract. To prove that the representation of fact is not true Banjo will need to prove four things:

- That false statement was made;

- That the statement was one of fact

- That it was addressed to the party misled (before or at the time the contract was made);

- That it was intended to induce and did actually induce the contract. Graw (2002 p. 274)

Hick sent Banjo a photograph with a note stating: âthis shows you the excellent condition of my car.â Hick was silent about that fact that the car was not âexpensiveâ model which Banjo asked for in his advertisement and probably described in details in the brochure. Generally, silence does not constitute misrepresentation; however, there are three fundamental exceptions to this presumption:

- Half truths;

- Statements which become false;

- Contracts uberrimae fidei. Graw (2002 p. 275)

The statement that does not present the whole truth may be regarded as misrepresentation. In my opinion, during the negotiations, Hick misleadingly told Banjo part of the truth. Banjo can argue before the court that he was misled by the information which was not fully disclosed by Hick, and therefore the false statement was made on Hickâs part.

With v OâFlanagan [1936] Ch 575

R v Kylsant [1932] 1 KB 442

Furthermore, silence can also constitute misleading or deceptive conduct under s 52 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)

Henjo Investment Pty Ltd v Collins Marrickville Pty Ltd (1988) 79 ALR 83

The statement which Hick did not fully disclose was addressed to Banjo. And the statement Hick made was the statement of fact.

In addition, Banjo must show that Hickâs statement was intended to induce and successfully induced him in entering the agreement with Hick.

Redgrave v Hurd (1881) 20 Ch D 1

Given the facts, it is clear to me that Banjo relied on Hickâs information and that Hickâs statement was material to the contract. There were no additional information provided during the negotiations by other parties, and there were no extrinsic factors which influenced Banjoâs decision to enter the contract. Banjo was influenced, and a reasonable person in Banjoâs position would have been influenced by Hickâs statements. In providing this information, Hick induced Banjo to enter the agreement.

Holmes v Jones (1907) 4 CLR 1692

Attwood v Small (1838) 6 CI & F 232

The argument in Hickâs defence is that he did not make a false statement about the car he was selling, and it was Banjo who was negligent to check the car before the contract was settled. Furthermore, Hick can argue that when he sent a photograph of his car to Banjo stating: âthis shows you the excellent condition of my carâ â that was a mere representation to influence on Banjo decision which occurs in regular dealings between the traders and the customers.

Dimmock v Hallett (1866) LR 2 Ch App 21

Hickâs statement was never meant to be binding. Therefore, his statement was not intended to be the term of the contract. In addition, Hick was not obliged to provide any further information about the car he was selling. Silence to any direct questions generally is not regarded as misrepresentation by courts.

Smith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597

In my opinion, Banjo has stronger arguments which show that the terms of the contract were misrepresented by Hick. Therefore, Banjo is entitled to rescind the contract.

References

Graw, S 2002 An Introduction to the Law of Contract, Lawbook Co, Sydney

Moles, Robert N 2006 Contract Law, Networked Knowledge, viewed on 21 August 2007 http://netk.net.au/ContractLaw.asp

Sawon, K 2007 LAWS 5009 â Commercial and Corporations LAW M (12980) Study Guide, City West Campus UniSA

Law subject essay

Anonymous — Sat, 25 Aug 2007 20:17:47 GMT

I have written an essay. It is for the law subject at undergraduate level. I am not a native English speaker.
Could someone help me and check my essay for grammar and other errors?

Many thanks,

Alex

http://picccs.mine.nu/pics/essay.htm

========================================================================================================

Mercantile Bank of Sydney v Taylor (1891) 12 LR (NSW) 252

- Was the statement followed by a reduction of the terms to writing and, if so, was the statement included?

- Did one party have special knowledge or skill on which the other was entitled to rely?

- How important was the statement in the minds of the parties? Graw (2002 p. 200)

Banjo prepared a brochure in which he described the car required for the film.

The brochure was enclosed with the letter Banjo sent to Hick stating: âI will be happy to buy your Graham car provided it is appropriate for our film which is described in the enclosed brochure.â

Nemeth v Bayswater Road Pty Ltd [1988] 2 Qd R 406

It is also clear from the facts that Hick possessed greater knowledge about the Graham car he was offering for sale. Hick was the owner of the car and Banjo relied on his knowledge about the car.

Dick Bentley Productions Ltd v Harold Smith Motors Ltd [1965] 1 WLR 623

Furthermore, it can be argued that a reasonable person in Hickâs position should have become aware of the fact that it was very important for Banjo to buy a rare, expensive Graham car manufactured in 1930âs, which was described in the brochure he provided to Hick.

Bannerman v White (1861) 10 CB (NS) 844; 142 ER 685

Given these arguments, in my opinion, the written statements Banjo made in his letters became the terms of the contract.

Banjo can support his case further stating that the information Hick provided was not fully disclosed. He trusted Hick who possessed greater knowledge about the car Hick was selling, and therefore Banjo was induced to buy the car by the statement Hick sent in his letter, and by the photograph Hick provided.

- That false statement was made;

- That the statement was one of fact

- That it was addressed to the party misled (before or at the time the contract was made);

- That it was intended to induce and did actually induce the contract. Graw (2002 p. 274)

Hick sent Banjo a photograph with a note stating âthis shows you the excellent condition of my car.â Hick was silent about that fact that the car was not âexpensiveâ model which Banjo asked for in advertisement and probably described in the brochure. Generally, silence does not constitute misrepresentation; however, there are three fundamental exceptions to this presumption:

- Half truths;

- Statements which become false;

- Contracts uberrimae fidei. Graw (2002 p. 275)

During the negotiation, Hick must not have misleadingly told only part of the truth. The statement that does not present the whole truth may be regarded as misrepresentation. Banjo can argue before the court that he was misled by the information which was not fully disclosed by Hick, and therefore the false statement was made on Hickâs part.

Nottingham Brick & Tile Co. v Butler (1889) 16 QBD 778

Krakowski v Eurolynx Properties Ltd (1995) 183 CLR 563

Furthermore, silence can also constitute misleading or deceptive conduct under s 52 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)

Henjo Investment Pty Ltd v Collins Marrickville Pty Ltd (1988) 79 ALR 83

The statement which Hick did not fully disclose was addressed to Banjo. And the statement Hick made was the statement of fact.

In addition, Banjo must show that Hickâs statement was intended to induce and successfully induced him in entering the agreement with Hick.

Given the facts, it is clear to me that Banjo relied on Hickâs information and that Hickâs statement was material to the contract. There were no additional information provided during the negotiation by other parties, and there were no extrinsic factors which influenced Banjoâs decision to enter the contract. Banjo was influenced, and any reasonable person in Banjoâs position would have been influenced by Hickâs statements. As a result, Banjo entered this agreement.

The argument in Hickâs defence is that he did not make a false statement about the car he was selling, and it was Banjo who was negligent to check the car before the contract was settled. Furthermore, Hick can argue that when he sent a photograph of his car to Banjo stating: âthis shows you the excellent condition of my carâ â this was a mere representation to influence on Banjo decision which occurs in regular dealings between the traders and the customers.

Dimmock v Hallett (1866) LR 2 Ch App 21

Hickâs statement was never meant to be binding. Therefore, his statement was not intended to be the term of the contract. In addition, Hick was not obliged to provide further information about the car he was selling. Silence to any direct questions generally is not regarded as misrepresentation by courts. This is stated in

Smith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597

In my opinion, Banjo has stronger arguments which show that the terms of the contract were misrepresented by Hick. Therefore, Banjo is entitled to rescind the contract.

Bibliography

Dr Moles, Robert N 2006 Contract Law, Networked Knowledge, viewed on 21 July 2007

http://netk.net.au/ContractLaw.asp

Graw, S 2002 An Introduction to the Law of Contract, Lawbook Co, Sydney

Re: Resposta: Re: Resposta: do you know where is it or it is??

CalifJim — Tue, 19 Jun 2007 02:20:12 GMT

Unfortunately, this is an area of English which may be slowly undergoing a change. Not only do non-native speakers have difficulty with it, but a surprising number of educated native speakers seem to be using the inverted structure "incorrectly" more and more. It is so prevalent that some books are calling it neither a direct question nor an indirect question, but a semi-indirect question!

It is probably better to stick to the "correct" version until so many people are doing it that the grammar experts finally give up and say it's perfectly fine!

You will find, however, that native speakers usually generate the "incorrect" form only when the indirect question is quite long -- almost never with indirect questions of very few words.

CJ

Re: Evolution - are all races equally developed?

Stannum — Sun, 10 Jun 2007 00:35:35 GMT

MrPedantic wrote:

Alexa and Stannum,

If my posts have the deleterious effect on you that you say, further discussion is naturally out of the question.

Thank you for an interesting debate,

MrP

Before you go away with your bruised feelings please reread the posts that have bruised your feelings.

Your posts are not the contentious issue here. Rather it is the lack of freedom to respond to your posts that is galling me.

I am all for an open and honest debate but it must be open and honest and not subject to deletions and blocked posts and heavy editing being required to get a post past the censors.

Maybe you are right and it is entirely possible that humans are the most intelligent beings on this planet but you will not convince anybody by going off on tangents, refusing to respond to fair dinkum questions posed and doing nothing but asking questions.

You have avoided every single pointed question I have posed to you and I have answered every question you posed.

I stated taht I considered myself to be highly intelligent and you turned this into some form of slur.

I ask you another direct question Mr P. Do you think that I am significantly less intelligent than you?

Does Mr Pedantic consider that there are many contributors or moderators who are significantly more intelligent than is Mr Pedantic?

Does Mr Pedantic consider that there are a fair number of contributors to this forum who are significantly less intelligent than is Mr Pedantic?

Does Mr Pedantic intend to answer any questions in this 'interesting debate' as a way of proving that his thanks proffered are anything more than empty rhetoric in a vainglorious attempt to make Mr Pedantic appear magnanimous?

Stannum

Re: would

CalifJim — Thu, 09 Mar 2006 03:23:34 GMT

Yes. I thought maybe that's what you were referring to.
would in an if clause is possible when the would or the entire if-clause is part of a formula of politeness. if you would be so kind is a typical example of if with would in a "politeness phrase". This formula is equivalent to please. This sort of if-clause does not even have to be classified as a true conditional even though it contains the word if.

The phrase would like as a polite way of saying want, and it too can appear in an if-clause. Note that the idiom would like counts as a present tense for purposes of tense combinations. That is, it may combine with the imperative or the future. The idiom would rather has the same property.

If you would like to have dinner with us tomorrow, please call and let us know before noon.
I'm sure that if he'd like to go with us, he'll tell us. (If he would like to go, he will tell us.)
If you'd rather wait until tomorrow, [just say so / I'll understand].

if-clauses that are part of an indirect question structure are also exempt from the rule about combining if and would:

I wonder if he would object to this procedure.
I don't know if I would agree.
We had not decided if we would go along with the plan.

With the exception of the indirect question structure, which is quite common, these are just a very, very small number of situations where if and would occur in the same clause. The main rule for 99.99999% of cases is 'never' to place if and would together!

CJ

Re: "No future tense in time clause"

Jack-in-the-box — Sun, 12 Sep 2004 23:54:03 GMT

Thank you very much.
As for number 7: I was thinking of sentences like "If you will pardon me for saying so, it's... (it'll be...)" I suppose that "will" is not the auxiliary verb here, but means "are willing to, want to" or something like that; so, it doesn't seem to be a true exception. Nevertheless, if one simply says, e. g., " never put 'will' after 'if' ", such a rule really doesn't work: because "if" may introduce an indirect question (= "whether"), as you noticed yourself; and because of such common phrases as "if you will pardon me".
"My heart is in the coffin": don't worry, I'm not that depressed. But I had written "Bear with me", and those words reminded me of what follows in Marc Antony's speech:

"Bear with me;
my heart is in the coffin there with Caesar,
and I must pause till it come back to me."

Just a silly quotation! (The second emoticon means: "Please come and have a good cup of coffee with us".)