Search results for 'tag:Literature tag:Metaphors' matching tags 'Literature' and 'Metaphors'

Re: from an apology of poetry

Anonymous — Mon, 09 Jun 2008 07:27:34 GMT

Stephen Conway

1995

Literature and Virtue in Sidneyâs âApology for Poetryâ

In "An Apology for Poetry" Sir Philip Sidney attempts to reassert the fundamental importance of literature to society in general as well as to other creative and intellectual endeavors. Though Sidney's work does provide a synthesis (and in some cases an aberration) of much Greek and Roman literary theory, his argument aspires to go beyond an esoteric academic debate. Literature can "teach and delight" in a manner which other methods of communication do not possess (138). The moral/ethical impact any literary text has upon a reader is of paramount importance to Sidney. The argument Sidney presents and develops is built around the assumption that literature has the capacity to teach most effectively and to demonstrate virtue. Perhaps in better understanding how Sidney specifically supports this claim, we can better assess its strength or validity

Sidney places literature in an hierarchical relationship with all other forms of learning; literature inhabits the highest and most influential tier. Literature is "the first light-giver to ignorance", and from it all other sources of knowledge have been nurtured (135). As the first use of language beyond the completely utilitarian, literature stretches and expands language to accommodate broader and more conceptual inquiries. Though an ardent admirer of Platonic philosophy, Sydney, in order to serve his intellectual exercise, rewrites or rehabilitates Plato's harsh stance on the worthlessness of literature. Unlike Plato's poet who perpetuates images far removed from the Truth, Sidney's poet can dip into the world of Forms, the Ideal, and provide us with knowledge of virtue. While the tangible world of appearances "is brazen, the poets only deliver a golden" (137).

Against the established disciplines of history and philosophy, Sidney also uses a revision of Aristotle's Poetics to help demonstrate how literature mediates the interests of both forms of knowledge in order to teach virtue. Where philosophy deals solely with the universal, history is consumed with the particular. Literature is able to deal with the same abstract moral/ethical (universal) concepts with which philosophy grapples by providing examples rooted in concrete, albeit fictionalized, details. History is too concerned with the accurate recording of facts to make any conjectures on such broad, less substantiated concepts. Literature exists between and above history and philosophy because the knowledge it conveys (knowledge of the good) is the best and most useful knowledge that exists. As Sidney states, "no learning is so good as that which teacheth and moveth to virtue, and that none can both teach and move thereto so much as poetry" (149).

Sidney attempts to provide an utterly rational foundation for his claims, however. He develops a systematic analysis of the mechanisms employed by literature to teach virtue. He sorts literature according to its works and its parts. The works of a literary text can be seen in four specific ethical effects which it should seek to elicit in a reader. Sidney defines these four as: the purifying of wit, enriching of memory, enabling of judgement, and enlarging of conceit (139).

In order to purify the wit, literature must engage the intellect in new and different ways. By allowing the reader to view a particular idea, character, or situation from a new or novel vantage point, literature is able to provide a vicarious, condensed education available through no other medium. Memories gathered from these fictional experiences provide a common frame of reference between otherwise disparate individuals. Fictional examples become touchstones which can be understood and experienced more easily by others. Literary memories point toward a more universal experience and invite the reader to find new and possibly profound meaning(s) in personal experiences as well. Sidney implies that a life without such memories would surely be impoverished. Building upon the first two works, literature also provides a reader with ample and necessary practise in making moral/ethical judgments. A literary text provides a safe outlet for such judgments to be made, discussed, and re-examined. Personal and societal codes of behavior are shaped, both strengthened and challenged, by this practise. Literature engages the reader actively with virtue as a part of this decision making process. To enlarge the conceit, literature also expands a reader's knowledge and understanding of language (in terms of style, structure, form) as well. This, in turn, opens new modes of expression, new metaphors, to a reader. The ability to create new and different texts is stamped into the very nature of literature. The ability to articulate and teach virtue effectively is constantly in flux from generation to generation. Literature is constantly in demand of new metaphors in order to remain resilient and relevant. Each narrative, housing the potential to fundamentally redefine and reevaulate itself, represents a metaphor for the world. Thus it is vital that literature possess this self perpetuating but continually evolving quality.

To discuss literature in its various parts, Sidney develops a series of stylistic, structural, and thematic categories: pastoral, elegiac, iambic, satiric, comic, tragic, lyric, and heroic. Each category (part) of literature also attempts to elicit a specific ethical response from the reader. The parts themselves are arranged hierarchically as well, with the heroic being placed at the top. Though an interesting (if historically outdated) method of division, Sidney's categories seem to elaborate more than advance his general argument, however. He places more emphasis on the ethical questions posed by the works of a literary text, rather than its parts.

Sidney concludes his comprehensive defense of literature by attempting to answer various challenges to its merit and continued support. The most serious of these allegations, that literature is "the nurse of abuse, infecting us with pestilent desires", Sidney is forced to acknowledge as true to a greater or lesser extent. This might seem, at first glance, to refute or undermine the argument he has labored so long to create. Sidney, however, has qualified his praise of literature from the onset. Literature can contribute to learning virtue but does not ensure virtuous action. Because he is aware of the fact that literature can and is abused by some, Sidney describes literature as a tool with the greatest potential for good, but not an inherently virtuous invention in and of itself. The destructive qualities evoked by literature are products of the fallible fragile human beings who created it, rather than an indictment of the evil nature of all literature in general. Do not, as Sidney states, "say that poetry abuseth man's wit, but that man's wit abuseth poetry" (150).

Sidney's responses have become the mainstay of the supporters of a liberal arts education. Unfortunately, literature has become sanctified to the extent that knowledge of literature has become practically synonymous with virtuous action. Such modern interpretations of Sidney's defense of literature seem to strike against the very heart of his argument. Sidney seems to understand all too well that human beings house both virtuous and vicious impulses; it is within our power to infuse our creations with both the sinister and the sublime. Because this is true of any human invention, Sidney counsels that the potential of literature for good or ill should not be easily discounted or dismissed.

Works Cited

Sidney, Philip. âAn Apology for Poetryâ The Critical

Tradition. Ed., David H. Richter, New York: St.

Martinâs Press, 1989.

Re: Deterioration of English Literature

The17pointscale — Mon, 18 Jun 2007 00:13:01 GMT

No, I wouldn't say that English literature is deteriorating. There's just a ton more of it to choose from--anyone with a decent sized wallet can publish their novel.

Moreover, I think bw2/3 is correct when he points to the changing desires of the book-reading audience. I might agree that popular literature is deteriotating. Fast-paced plots with cute love stories tend to become best-sellers (and then movies) whereas literary fiction with metaphors, similies, stylistic innovations, and deep meaning often sit on the shelf like unwanted treasures. But they're out there. I sometimes volunteer for the Image journal, which publishes all kinds of good stuff.

If you're looking for good contemporary authors, I'd recommend David James Duncan and Cormac McCarthy.

-Andrew

Re: Deterioration of English Literature

Anonymous — Sun, 17 Jun 2007 14:46:57 GMT

I don't have a degree in English so I don't study much about classic novel authors writing. I guess different authors have different styles; however, I know the classic novels have tremendously quality than the current bestsellers, though read only a couple.

So, isn't that good enough to think English Literature deteriorating. I don't know. May be today books are written for different audience. They don't need much how to make a reader to sympathy the main character in the book. I guess if you read a bestseller for fun, but if you read classic you learn a lot.

Isn't it Robinson Crusoe the first book that other authors tried to write like that? Me, I have never read the book. I think it will be bored me to death. Nevertheless, I will like to read it when my English is upto the proficiency level.

metaphors, similes, alliteration (no ideal what those mean in literature.)

bw2/3

Deterioration of English Literature

Anonymous — Wed, 13 Jun 2007 04:40:01 GMT

Well, I'm not saying that English Literature is deteriorating. But when you think about it, books of today have lost a sense of structure that gave english an artistic feel. When you compare the classics from the popular books of today, anyone can tell the obvious difference. I personally love the classics. Scott Fitzgerald, Margaret Atwood, Louisa May Alcott, Charles Dickes, Jane Austen, John Steinbeck, these are the people whose literature we are supposed to study in school. I must admit that I am not a big reader, but I couldn't help but notice how different the writing style is from these authors to the authors of today. I dislike today's authors, starting from J.K. Rowling. After reading Little Woman, I was forced to read Harry Potter, and I disliked J.K. Rowling's writing style. Not because it was too casual, but because it lacked a poetic and artistic feel. I believe that literature is art, yet the literature of today have declined in artistic quality. It has been more about the story as opposed to the structure and the story combined.

The book that totally made not want to read any more modern literature is Stephanie Meyers' Twilight. Don't take me wrong, I liked the basic story line, and I like how cute their relationship was. But it was hard to see the artistic quality in the structure of the book. What happened to the metaphors, similes, alliteration, and the rest that could make any be hightened.

Please give your opinions " title=" (Smile)" height="15" width="15">

grammatical check

Murajica — Fri, 12 May 2006 02:19:51 GMT

Dear Members!

I am a new member and I would need some urgent academic help. Tomorrow i have to submit an essay for my postgraduate study. as Slovenian I am not sure if everything is in order in the essay. I attached the essay in this message. If anybody would consider looking into my essay I would be more then glad about that.

Introduction

This essay represents a possible answer to the question of the transforming the form of power from classical physical, person-to-person alike configurations to the new formation of ubiquitous - virtual â power. In contemporary society the classical Benthamâs idea of Panopticon has been employed to society as an âElectronic Panopticonâ wherein government agencies, commercial interests and corporations use information technologies to sort people into âgroupsâ or âtypesâ. Supervisors exert power over the supervised in some manner or other (King 2001). As some authors still interpret Western society with the few-watch-many panopticon model, called as exclusionary fortress (King 2001), others are more focused on many-watch-few the Synopticon model (Bauman 1998). Yet, essay examines the similarities and differences of those two models, with an additional consideration to a hybrid model of the superpanopticism.

Why is than that this utilitarian two hundred years old idea of panopticon survived and extended in to new â hybrid â forms? This essay provides also the retrospective of the development of the power and public surveillance from the panoptic initial idea till nowadays electronic global power.

The spread of globalization and electronic era brought new technologies in everybodyâs everyday life. Over all, I should repeat the questions raised by Lyon (1994) whether do those new technologies spell a qualitatively new surveillance? If so, does this add up to the emergence of a more authoritarian, prison-like society? I conclude with the question if this is really prison-like society for everybody or only for non reluctant citizen. Therefore, is the new society really the limited society? Do we as contemporary residents have lack of opportunities and live in virtual cells or are we all just blinded and idled of all opportunities?

But again, what about the residents of the non-western, âunderdevelopedâ world â under what source and type of the surveillance do they live and what is their opportunity of resistance when they choose to âenterâ the West â so called surveillance society. What does it mean to shift the âreal jungleâ with the âmanufactured jungleâ?

From Panopticon to Synopticon

Todayâs society is often called as surveillance society. Many consider contemporary society as Post-Panopticon society, as a copy of initial idea of the total, the 360 degree surveillance area.

In the eighteen century a British reformer Jeremy Bentham presented the blueprint of optimal surveillance object called the Panopticon. This rounded structure with the watch tower in the axis of circle gives the gatekeeper/supervisor the ability to see all without being seen; ultimately it gives the keeper the ability to exert power over the inmates. Primary, it was meant to revolutionise the way in which prisons were administrate (King 2001). âThere were no more bars, no more chains, no more heavy locksâ¦â (Foucault 1991: 202)

In the Panopticon, the peripheral mass cannot see the observers, and must assume that someone may be watching over them at all time (Boyne 2000). One of the most influential theoretic of the philosophy of Panopticon, Michael Foucault describes it as a machine for dissociating the see/being seen dyad. In the ring, one is totally seen, without ever seeing, when on the other side in the core tower, one sees everything without ever being seen (Foucault 1991). Another weighty sociologist Zygmunt Bauman foremostly sees Panopticon as a weapon against difference, choice and variety (1998). In this point, we can presume that Panopticon is really an opposite idea of democracy. But, as we will see latter, many connect the panopticism with the Western democratic society. Bauman further claims that âThe Panopticonâs main purpose was to install discipline and to impose a uniform pattern on the behaviour of its inmates.â (Bauman 1998:50)

A pictorial description of original Benthamâs Panopticon was provided by Foucault, describing it as an architectural figure of this composition. He describes the principle on which it was based:

ââ¦at the periphery, an annular building; at the centre, tower. A watchtower is pierced with wide windows that open onto inner side of the ring. The peripheral building is divided into cells, each of which extends the whole width of the building. They have two windows, one on the inside, corresponding to the windows of the tower; the other, on the outside, allows the light to cross the cell from one end to other. All that is needed, than, is a supervisor in a central tower and to shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker or a school boy.â (Foucault 1991: 200)

While poignant, the architecture of Foucaultâs version of Benthamâs Panopticon produces a kind of double vision; two different, divergent stories of the development of evidently modern relations of surveillance, domination and control. Firstly, the story of what goes on with the supervisor or inspector in the central tower and secondly what happens to the person in the cell. The tale of the supervisor takes us to the techniques of observation, information gathering, data management, simulation and to (what Foucault later describes as) âa biopolitics of the populationâ (Simon 2005). George Orwell (1984 in Simon 2005:4) precisely describes the effect as a result of Panopticon:

âThere was of course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any given moment. How often, or on what system, the Thought Police plugged in on any individual wire was guesswork. It was even conceivable that they watched everybody all the timeâ¦ You had to live â did live, from habit that became instinct â in the assumption that every sound you made was overheard, and, except in darkness, every moment scrutinized.â

The Panoptic machine makes one visible and at the same time it hides the operations (motives, practice, and ethics) of the supervisor. This relation (being seen without being able to see) provides uncertainty which become a source of anxiety, discomfort and even terror (Simon 2005).

In The Panopticon also the observers were under possible control, it may ever provide an apparatus for supervising its own mechanisms. (Foucault 1991)

One of the important deficiencies of the Panopticon model was exposed by Simon (2005). Though, the Panopticon makes all acts in principle visible in cannot distinguish between acts that conform to the rules and acts which pretend co conform to the rules. Nevertheless, the idea of Panopticon is not always the optimal explanation for the role of power in the modern society. Although, as we will se latter, we can easily name modern public sphere with Foucaultian expression âlaboratory of powerâ, has the contemporary society mirrored the sight to the surveillance. The supervision of the few watching the many has turned to the many watching the few.

Reading with Foucault rather than against him Mathesion (in Simon 2005) theorizes a role for the synoptic machine of the contemporary culture industries; accounted for by the critical theory tradition. By the critics like Mathesion and Baudrillard the individualâs relation to the modern media is rather synoptic than panoptic; the relation is extremely visual, where the many (an audience) observe the few (the television programme). But yet we can argue, that provided synoptic apparatus is in tight symbiosis with the panoptic. But one can at this point draw on media theory and argue that synoptic function of the media is the production of homogenous knowledge and wide spread culture (ibid.).

At this point in the theory, the Synopticon emerged as the hybrid version of the Panopticon. Thomas Mathiesen coined the memorial phrase, where the introduction of panoptical power represented a fundamental transformation from situation where the few watch the many to a situation where the many watch the few (Bauman 1998). Bauman (1998) further adds that Synopticon is in its nature global. The watchers are united from their locality and at least spiritually they are transported into cyberspace. Distance no longer matters, even if bodily they remain in place. Globalization is not about what we all wish or hope to do, it is about what happening in the worldwide level, it is about what is happening to all of us (ibid.). It does not matter any more if the targets of the Synopticon mutated from the watched into the watchers stay in the place or move around the globe. And who are the new watched population at whom Synopticon âaim its arrowsâ?

âThe many watch the few. The few who are watched are the celebrities. They may come from the world of politics, of sport, of science or show business, or just be celebrated information specialists. Wherever they come from, though, all displayed celebrities put on display the world of celebrities â a world whose main distinctive feature is precisely the quality of being watched â by many, and in all corners of the globe: of being global in their capacity of being watched.â (Bauman 1998:53)

The main difference by the word of Bauman (1998) is that Panopticon forced people into the position where they could be watched, but Synopticon on the other hand needs no coercion. People are seduced into watching and the watched few are tightly selected. Surveillance and consecutively the power are therefore spreading among all of us. We-as the audience are all the part of Synopticon and therefore we are all in the possession of power. We have the possibility to survey and the possibility to be a part of the apparatus. The fictive power is dividing from our television receiver to yours receiver. The power and the surveillance are spreading through the signals, networks and internet connections and they are imaginatively connecting us. Ultimately, we are all part of the game of surveillance, gathered in the electronic arena, where in a fictive menagerie we watch over the selected few. We are covetous for their private life. Their privacy is our required publicity.

The development of new technologies and new techniques of power, consist â on the contrary â in the many watching the few. That is shown in the rise of mass media â television more than any other. That leads to the creation, alongside the Panopticon, of another power mechanism which, coining another apt phrase â Synopticon (Bauman 1998).

History review of surveillance and power

Lyon (1994) sets out as prominent work about surveillance two main traditions the Marxian and the Weberian. Karl Marxâs special attention on surveillance is in aspect of the struggle between labour and capital, where worker is viewed as a means of maintaining managerial control on behalf of capital. Opposite, Max Webber concentrates on the manners that all modern organizations develop means of storing and retrieving data in the form of files as part of the quest of efficient practice within bureaucracy. Such files contain personal information so that government can supervise population. Furthermore, we should opt on Foucaultâs contribution to surveillance theory. He claims that modern societies have introduced and employed a range of disciplinary practices rather than relaying on external controls and constrains. This practice is necessary for life to continue in a regularized patterned way. (Lyon 1994)

For Foucault (1991) the panopticism is the general principle of new political elites, who use it as a relation of discipline and not the relation of sovereignty. He sees the idea of panopticism have spread over the globe:

ââ¦although the universal juridicism of modern society seems to fix limits on the exercise of power, its universally widespread panopticism enables it to operate, in the underside of the law, a machinery that is both immense and minute, which supports, reinforces, multiplies the asymmetry of power and undermines the limits that are traced around the law. /â¦/ in the genealogy of modern society, they have been, with the class domination that traverses it, the political counterpart of the juridical norms according to which power is redistributed. (Foucault 1991: 223)

Governments in 1960s and 1970s developed large-scale date integration projects, which had raised the fear of the omniscient âBig Brotherâ state. In that time individuals knew when data about them, and for whom and for what reason had been collected. Surveillance systems at that time were discrete and bounded. The concept of databanks expressed a technological and political reality that personal information system had some clear boundaries (Bennett 2001). 1970s were also the time of Orwellian Big Brother states.â This position might be contrasted with that of Lyon (1994) who kept the Orwellian nightmare of 1984 at bay with a Foucauldian emphasis on discipline but has moved on (Lyon, 2001) to incorporate some of the arguments about risk society from Beck.â (Lyon, 2001:10-113).

Anthony Giddens (in Lyon 1994) describes some differences of surveillance in the western societies and the surveillance in the totalitarian eastern block. He finds a gap distinction between surveillance as âgathering data onâ and âsupervisingâ people. Giddens claims that totalitarianism is, first of all, an extreme focusing of surveillance (ibid.). But the changes in the political systems, the global technological progress and above all the globalization changed the rules. To conquer and survey the world, one does not need to be present in all places for all the time.

âIn the world we inhabit, distance does not seem to matter much. Sometimes it seems that it exists solely in order to be cancelled; as if space was but a constant invitation to slight it, refute and deny. Space stopped being an obstacle â one needs just a split second to conquer it.â (Bauman 1998:77)

In fact, as Kavanagh (1996 in Bauman 1998) stated, globalization is a paradox. While it is very beneficial to a very few, it leaves out or marginalizes two-thirds of the world.

Latest surveillance studies have gone further than Foucault in demonstrating new data collection with sophisticated, yet manipulated forms to alter, manage or even control the live chances of the supervised person (Gandy 1993). As an example Simon (2005) proposes census data, used to generate profiles of various populations to guide the development of government policies, which have further define effects on persons, independent of their knowledge. Only a step away is insurance data, credit information, marketing data etc. In all this cases, data obtained from people is managed independently and used to structure the lives of those people.

New forms of surveillance

As we see, in the contemporarily people are facing the paradoxical situation, where everybody can be the object of observation and simultaneously the subject that execute the surveillance. The strength of the surveillance is taking away our privacy; it prevails into ours most intimate moment and places. The systems of surveillance possess the power for assembling and finally to assemble all needed information that we have ever put into the circulation. Our credit card or post code of our home address, calls made from the mobile and even type of food that we buy in our favourite shop with our favourite club card all tell more about us than we would at anytime wanted to be known. In the traditionally disciplinary the object of surveillance was the body but in âdataveillanceâ the object of control is simply the digital representation of the body (Simon 2005). Huge data collection systems connected to each other also support each other with the latest information about us and use us and information about us as crucial capital and power.

âNo one is spying on us, exactly, although for many people that is what it feels like if and when they find out just how detailed a picture of us is available. âTheyâ know things about us, but we often donât know what they know, why they know, or with whom else they might share their knowledge.â (Lyon 1994:4)

Dataveillance (the collection, organization and storage of information about persons) and biometrics (the use of the body as a measure of identity) have not only come into focus with the post 9/11 security consciousness of state institutions. These technologies are now becoming a regular feature of the everyday lives and culture of citizens. (Simon 2005)

Deluze (1992 in Simon 2005:17) for example claims that in societies of control what is important is no longer either a signature or a number, but a code â the code is a password and it stand in for bodies. He remarks âthe numerical language of control is made of codes that mark access to information, or reject it. We no longer find ourselves dealing with the mass/individual pair. Individuals have become âdividualsâ and masses, samples, data, markets or âbanksâ.â We can support the Deluzeâs idea with a claim that societies have shifted from disciplinary societies to societies of control. This idea parallels the critiques of panopticism, which point to a shift away from classical visual surveillance to dataveillance as a mode of ordering information. Clark (1988 in Howard et al. 2005:69) coined the term dataveillance to signify âthe systematic use of personal data systems in the investigation or monitoring of the actions or communications of one or more personsâ in an effort to analyze the potential for new digital technologies to allow âincreased surveillance of the citizen by the state, and the consumer by the corporation.â

Simon (2005) claims, that the surveillance apparatus does not act on bodies or minds but on information about them. Thus, we can say that dataveillance corresponds to the modulatory effects of power, as it is described by Deleuze (1992 in Simon 2005:15):

âthe image of a city âwhere one would be able to leave oneâs apartment, oneâs street, oneâs neighbourhood, thanks to oneâs âdividual electronic card that raises a given barrier; but the card could just as easily be rejected on a given day or between certain hours; what counts is not the barrier but the computer that tracks each personâs position â licit or illicit â and effects a universal modulationâ.

Poster (1992) explains the shift to control societies in terms of the superpanopticism. He argues that, it does not operate through external force or expected internal norms but rather in terms of discourse and the linguistic properties of digital computation. The electronic database is the core of the superpanopticon, it is a sorting machine that organizes and produces subjects. As David Lyon summarizes:

the subject is multiplied and decentred in the database, acted on by remote computers each time a record is automatically verified or checked against another, without ever referring to the individual concerned /â¦/ computers become machines for producing retrievable identities (Lyon 2001: 115).

Poster (1992??preveri ker spodaj maÅ¡ 1996) writes about new forms of power where the unwanted surveillance of personal choice becomes a discursive reality through the willing participation of the surveilled individual. In this instance the play of power and discourse is uniquely configured. The one being surveilled provides the information necessary for surveillance.

The diagram of superpanopticism is not a diagram of surveillance in the traditional sense, no one is watching us and we do not perceive ourselves as being watched. We simply go about our business while our databased selves are assembled, scrutinized and evaluated in much more detail than the inmates at Foucaultâs Mettray prison ever experienced (ibid.).

At the same time we allow the surveillance as we are part of surveillance society â where for exchange of our information we can be part of âthe manyâ that watch âthe fewâ. We live in the Panopticon but at the same time we participate and even with ease enjoy the Synopticon. Foucaultâs version of Benthamâs plan has been upgraded, so that the inmate is aware of the gaze of the supervisor through signs of their presence. This is initially ominous tower with its shielded windows signifying the presence of the guards, but it could also easily be the insidious sign of the CCTV camera or the spy satellite as material extensions of the human eye (Simon 2005).

However, it is the sign of presence of surveillance and not its actual presence that matters here. Yet we can say that this is what makes possible to substitute fake supervisor (cameras) for real ones and still achieve the same effects of power and domination. (Norris 2003). Or as Foucault (1991:200) claims âvisibility is a trap.â

Lyon (1994) claims that interesting challenge to surveillance studies presented by processes such as computer-matching is than an essentially technical procedure contribute to the blurring of conventionally conceived boundaries.

King (2001) asserts that Panopticon is still a useful metaphor for the examination of the world we live in and as well understanding of its history and how it is mirrored in nowadays Western society.

It is on this point that the critique of Foucault takes on its strongest form. As Anthony Giddens (1990) has noted, modern surveillance can be denoted by increasing distances between the observer and the observed. So can we ultimately find the connections between the initial Panopticon prison idea and modern surveillance society? Following Gary Marx (1988 in Simon 2005) we can extrapolate from guards in the watchtower to some hi-tech management and policing systems: a kind of prototypical hybrid-police-cyborg using progressively more sophisticated technical capacity for monitoring (CCTV, infrared cameras, electronic tags), data storage (huge hard drives systems), networking (data conversion) and analysis (systems capable of advanced pattern recognition and multivariate sorting) (ibid.).

Particular forms of communication are vital aspects of what it means to be human. What we disclose to whom, and under what conditions, is highly significant. What once we might have revealed, consciously, about ourselves to someone we trust â friend, doctor, priest, therapist â may now be involuntarily disclosed by electronic means to organizations or machines that we cannot know, let alone trust, in the same way (Lyon 1994).

âPrecise details of our personal lives are collected stored, retrieved and processed every day within huge computer databases belonging to big corporations and government departments. This is âsurveillance societyâ.â (Lyon 1994:3)

An interesting comparison with the new Lyonâs surveillance society was a lot earlier provided by Foucault, when he talked about the power of the Panopticon. He considers the activity of the Panopticon also as a kind of laboratory of power. Because of its mechanisms of observation, it gains in efficiency and in the ability to penetrate into menâs behaviour; knowledge follows the advances of power, discovering new objects of knowledge over all the surfaces on which power is exercised (Foucault 1991). Introducing the Panopticon into the contemporary society, we can understand the present public sphere â surveyed, tracked and surrounded with the linked apparatuses filled with data of citizens as a huge laboratory of virtual power.

For Mark Poster the post-modern is classified as a âmode of informationâ. He raises the question of location of human self if fragments of personal data constantly circulate within computer systems, beyond any agentâs personal control. (Lyon 1994)

Further, for Bauman (1998), then, the dream of total control, exemplified by the Panopticon, is really fully applicable only within a âclockworkâ society, whose inhabitants are required to have fixed places, functions and appetites. âAdvanced Westernâ societies are not like this. On the other hand, for the inhabitants of the first world state borders are levelled down, as they are dismantled for the worldâs commodities, capital and finances. But for the inhabitant of the second world, the walls built of immigration controls, of residence laws, and of âclean streetsâ and âzero toleranceâ policies, grow taller. (Bauman 1998)

My thesis and conclusion

The provided literature and shown examples have, therefore, made a systematic case in support of the proposition that technology and advance have made possible the systems of domination and power, especially virtual apparatus to supervise with supremacy over the people of postmodernity. As power is indeed strongly roped with forms of technology, it is possible to agree that power is nowadays virtual in form, with âsurveillance /â¦/, as an institutionally central and pervasive feature of social lifeâ¦â (Lyon 1994:24)

In fact, it is interesting to accept the fact that new virtual forms of information technology are constructing society as well physically (modern surveillance systems) as also socially (changing of public behaviour, new ways of pleasure and voyeurism â when many watch the few, or surveillance for pleasure, etc.). Although, it is significant to point out that in contemporary society â as Anthony Giddens called it with felicitous phrase, a âmanufactured jungleâ no physical presence of âanotherâ is needed to perceive his influential power and surveillance; no matter what place or what moment in the society do we take into consideration.

The power of supervision has developed in recent years with the speed of the development of science and technology. With introduction of new â especially virtual technology apparatuses, one is becoming even more âthe objectâ of observation and surveillance. Discrepancy between private â intimate side of life and the public access to oneâs personal matters has blurred to the degree, where one can no more foresight when, how and by who is observed at the particular moment. Yet, I could agree with intimidated and tighten theories of âtotal disclosureâ proposed by theoretic of surveillance (Orwell, Lyon, Foucault, etc.), where apparatus of the state, economic and media govern its population in the scheme of matrix. Individual can be metaphorical staged with the famous Foucaultian quote:

âHe is seen, but he does not see he is the object of information, never a subject in communication.â (Foucault 1991: 200)

One has no more option to be under self control only, but has become the object of the total observation drawled in the matrix of the mass.

Is the new democracy really the new totalitarianism with millions of pigeonholes or is it opposite of the verified systems with negative connotation, known from the past?

At the Titoâs Yugoslavia there was a well known âbrainwashâ rule proposed by the government to its population saying that âNon-friend never sleeps! Everybody has to be aware at all time.â Citizens attended to be continuously frightened and therefore they suppose to trust the state and follow and obey its instructions. Police, army and other political commissars controlled the nation with ceaseless personal control. The possibility of resistance was at minimum, boundaries were almost closed and one had almost no place to manoeuvre.

Therefore, I can somehow not find the direct linking between new âWesternâ types of surveillance and old totalitarian types of all-time pressure surveillance and I can easily argue that at this moment one has a possibility of choice whether he would like to allow (or not disallow) to be supervised or yet he can resist and try to ignore the systems of surveillance in the name of his belonging right to the privacy. Resistance always demands more inclusion then following and obeying â but what matters here is the choice of not being supervised and therefore at least in the legitimate way choice of own personal private life. In the time of the stateâs personal surveillance â this possibility was not directly an option.

Such arguments, I would argue and widen with the fact that global life is possibly becoming multidimensional and as well extremely rapid â consecutively one has no more energy, time or even possibility to pay attention of own surveillance. Equally, it can be also possible to argue King (2001) which claims that information and communication technologies have advanced at an incredible rate, so that we can do things that at one time were not possible but at the same time we have become traceable to an unprecedented degree. But the fact remains: power has become in modern society virtual in form â whether we accept it or not. The only question is, whether we are utterly loosing the connection when and how the new technologies is going to track us.

Resources:

- Bauman Z. (1998) Globalization â The Human Conequences Cambridge: Polity.

- Bennett J. C. (2001) âCookies, web bugs, webcams and cue cats: Patterns of surveillance on the world wide webâ Ethic and Information Technology Vol.3 pp.197-201.

- Boyne R. (2000) âPost-Panopticismâ Economy and Society Vol.29 No.2 pp.285-307.

- Foucault M. (1991 [1975]) Discipline and Punish â The Birth of the Prison London: Penguin Books.

- Gandy, O. (1993). The Panoptic Sort: A Political Economy of Personal Information. Boulder, CO, Westview Press.

- Giddens, A. (1990) The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge, Polity Press.

- Green, S. (1999) âA Plague on the Panopticon: Surveillance and Power in the Global Information Economy.â Information, Communication and Society 2(1): 26-44.

- Howard N. P., Carr N. J. and Milstein J. T. (2005) âDigital Technology and the Market for Political Surveillanceâ Surveillance & Society Vol.3 No.1 pp.59-73.

- King L. (2001) âInformation, Society and the Panopticonâ The Western Journal o Graduate Research Vol. 10, No.1 pp.40-50.

- Norris, C. (2003) âFrom Personal to Digital: CCTV, the Panopticon and the Technological Mediation of Suspicion and Social Control.â Surveillance as Social Sorting. D. Lyon (ed.). London, Routledge.

- Lyon D. (1994) The Electronic Eye â The Rise of Surveillance Society Cambridge: Polity Press.

- Lyon, D. (2001) Surveillance Society: Monitoring Everyday Life. Buckingham, Open University Press.

- Poster, M. (1996) âDatabases as Discourse, or, Electronic Interpellations.â Computers, Surveillance, and Privacy. D. Lyon and E. Zureik (eds.). Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press: 175-192.

- Simon B. (2005) âThe Return of Panopticism: Supervision, Subjection and New Surveillanceâ Surveillance & Society Vol.3 No.1 pp.1-20 online: http://www.surveillance-and-society.org

Re: wide/deep

MrPedantic — Thu, 27 Oct 2005 00:37:24 GMT

Hmm. Let me rephrase it:

"To my mind, 'deep' acts as a complement, and tells us something about the subject at the end of the process; whereas 'deeply' tells us something about the process itself."

"Wide" in this context is presumably meant to relate to "breadth of emotion, etc".

The problem with the example is that it expresses a metaphor with only one term. We know that X goes deep and wide, and that it goes deeper and wider than another X; and we know that one X is like music, and the other X is like literature.

But what goes deep and wide? Some kind of surgical instrument, maybe?

What do you picture?

MrP

Some synonyms for you

jonathan1980tr — Sun, 18 Sep 2005 07:36:12 GMT

Synonyms

Annihilate: demolished

Exodus: Flight

Reprimand: reproved

Stagnant: fetid

Servitude: captivity

Slapdash: sloppy

Accomplice: confederate

Succumb: expire

Catalyst: stimulus

Prattle: chattered

Paramount: foremost

Hamper: impede

Ghastly: Gruesome

Defray: pay for

Bondage: captivity

Intricate: complex

Posthumous: postmortem

Lucid: clear

Tenacious: dogged

Doleful: melancholy

Taunt: insulting remarks

Opaque: cloudy

Efface: obliterated

Brigand: bandits

Deadlock: stalemate

Salvage: rescue

Spasmodic: fitful

Dilemma: predicament

Perennial: recurring

Muddle: mess

Breach: violation

Debris: wreckage

Alien: unfamiliar

Compensate: reimburse

Expulsion: ouster

Fodder: feed

Illegible: indecipherable

Adjourn: suspend

Lucrative: gainful

Proliferate: multiply

Sully: taints

Tantalize: tempted

Unflinching: unwavering

Marauder: freebooter

Pauper: destitute person

Pilfer: filched

Condone: turn a blind eye to

Irate: enraged

Usurp: commandeered

Cherubic: angelic

Fabricate: make up

Rift: split

Surmounted: conquered

Absconded: made off

Access: admittance

Larceny: burglary

Hoodwinked: duped

Reprievment: postponement

Rectify: correct

Precipice: cliff

Antonyms:

Circumspect: reckless

Spurious: valid

Opinionated: open-minded

Relinquish: retained

Admonish: praised

Comely: plain

Fortify: undermined

Terse: verbose

Dissolute: virtuous

Mediocre: exceptional

Obscure: eminent

Dissent: harmony

Obesity: emaciation

Terminate: initiated

Trite: fresh

Pompous: unaffected

Arduous: easy

Inanimate: lively

Auspicious: ominous

Morose: cheerful

Rebut: corroborate

Latent: manifest

Facilitate: impeded

Arbitrary: rational

Diligent: lazy

Superfluous: vital

Prim: lax

Impoverished: affluent

Incessant: occasional

Speaker: the voice in a poem

Diction: a writerâs choice of words

Connotation: the suggested meanings of a word or phrase; the meanings and feelings that have become associated with the word, in addition to its explicit meaning

Imagery: words or phrases that use description to create pictures, or images, in the readerâs mind.

Rhyme Scheme: the pattern of rhymes in a stanza or poem

Couplets: a pair of successive rhymed lines of poetry

Alliteration: the repetition of consonant sounds in a group of words close together

Assonance: the repetition of vowel sounds in a group of words close together

Onomatopoeia: the use of word whose sound imitates or reinforces its meaning

Figurative Language: language that is used to describe one thing in terms of something else; language that is not intended to be taken literally

Simile: a direct comparison made between two unlike things, using a word of comparison such as like or as

Metaphor: a comparison made between two things which are basically dissimilar, with the intent of giving added meaning to one of them

Personification: a figure of speech in which something nonhuman is given human characteristics or feelings

Symbol: something in a literary work which maintains its own meaning while at the same time standing for something broader than itself

Tone: the attitude a writer takes toward the subject or the reader of a work of literature

Theme: the main idea expressed in a literary work; the central insight that the work gives us about human life

Pun: a humorous play on words, using either (1) two or more different meanings of the same word, or (2) two or more words that are spelled and pronounced somewhat the same but have different meanings

Allusion: a reference to a work of literature or to a well-known historical event, person, or place

Refrain: one or more words, phrases, or lines that are repeated regularly in a poem, usually at the end of each stanza

Stanza: a group of related lines that forms a division of a poem or a song

Rhythm: in language, the arrangement of stressed and unstressed syllables

Meter: the regular pattern of rhythmâthat is, of stressed and unstressed syllables in a line of verse

Blank Verse: verse written in unrhymed iambic pentameterâthat is, with each line usually containing five iambs, which consist of an unstressed syllable followed by a stressed syllable

Sonnet: a lyric poem having fourteen rhymed lines, usually written in iambic pentameter

Haiku: 17 syllable poem

Hyperbole: a figure of speech that uses exaggeration or overstatement for effect

Narrative: poetry that tells a story

Lyric: verse, usually brief, which focuses on the emotions or thoughts of the speaker

Dramatic: poetry in which one or more characters speak

Poetic License: a writerâs freedom to break conventional rules in order to use language playfully and creatively, usually to create mood or enhance meaning

31. Plot: the sequence of related events that make up a story or a drama

32. Climax: the moment of highest emotional intensity in a plot, when the outcome of the conflict is finally made clear to us

33. Setting: the time and place in which the events of a literary work take place

34. Flashback: a scene in a story or play that interrupts the present action to tell about events that happened at an earlier time

35. Exposition: the kind of writing that explains a subject or provides information

36. Irony: a contrast or discrepancy between what it states and what is really meant, or between what is expected to happen and what actually does happen

37. Conflict: a struggle between two opposing forces in a piece of literature. Can take many forms, may be external or internal

o Person vs. person

o Person vs. society

o Person vs. nature

o Person vs. self

38. Denouement: a final unraveling of all complications

The final resolution or clarification of a dramatic or narrative plot.
The outcome of a sequence of events; the end result.

39. Atmosphere: the general mood or feeling established in a work of literature

40. Foreshadowing: the use of clues that hint at important plot developments that are to follow in a story or drama

41. Direct Characterization: read through writing, the author simply tells you what the character is like (writer explicitly tells us what they are like)

42. Indirect Characterization: you learn about the character through their actions and comments other characters make regarding them (writer makes us figure out for selves)

43. Literal Language: language that states facts or ideas directly

44. Denotation: the explicit meaning of a word, as listed in a dictionary

45. Free Verse: poetry that doesnât have a fixed line length, stanza form, rhyme scheme, or meter

46. Resolution: the conclusion is shown and then conflict in the story is resolved

Re: has anyone read Lolita

Roro — Sat, 23 Jul 2005 09:53:33 GMT

Hi Jersey!ã

I'm sure Nabokov deserves to be on the reading list of you, but I'd sincerely advise you to read it leisurely, with pleasure (not to learn English in any case!).
He is very famous as a trial to translators. His novels are full of hints at / quote from Russian literature, to say nothing of metaphors!

..........{quote from 'Spring in Fialta'}..................................................

... I am fond of Fialta; I am fond of it because I feel in the hollow of those violaceous syllables the sweet dark dampness of the most rumpled of small flowers, and because the alto-like name of a lovely Crimean town is echoed by its viola; and also because there is something in the very somnolence of its humid Lent that especially anoints one's soul.

..................................................................................................

(I myself read him in translation first, then try to read in original...)

Re: In your own words, how do you define poetry?

anita_a — Tue, 19 Apr 2005 23:46:19 GMT

A poem is composition which conveys experiences, ideas, or emotions in a vivid and imaginative way. Poetry is a form of literature where u study about poets and their poems.It is not necessary that all poems have rhyme.They are called free verses. Some poems have metre, rhyme and metaphor too.And not all poets use imagery.

I would say that words put together in sentences which sound beautiful to the reader and have some kind of meaning or message in it or just captures the poet's emotions or imagination is poetry.

Re: Why do so many Moslems hate the Western World - New Yorker

matthewg — Wed, 26 Jan 2005 15:48:10 GMT

Some very good points brought up, but, although I'd like to, this is not the right place to go into the merits of each one.

However, there is one thing relevant to language:

A nation is a concept with tangible and clearly defined objective existence.

That is a glaring contradiction in terms: a concept is by definition intangible. The concept of a nation is subjective, because it is based around human existence, which can not be described as 'objective' for as long as it can't be measured or touched.

It is easy to fall into the trap of reifying the concept: speaking of an abstract idea as though it is an object which can be touched or seen, like a chunk of stone. This is one of the disadvantages of the extensive use of metaphor in the English language: it tricks people into thinking the impossible. For example the reification of 'labour' as 'human resources', which has succeeded in turning humans into marketable commodities, and therefore fooling us into thinking that human existence is objective.

Recommended Reading:

Joseph Gabel, False Consciousness: An Essay on Reification (Harpercollins, 1985)

Bryan D. Palmer, Descent into Discourse: The Reification of Language and the Writing of Social History (Temple, 1990)

PS: I am closing this thread, however you might like to consider starting a new discussion - which is related to English - with some topics we have discussed here. A hero/villain discussion would be especially useful to students of English literature.