Search results for 'tag:Literature tag:Modals' matching tags 'Literature' and 'Modals'

Re: use of modals for past sense

Marius Hancu — Sun, 11 May 2008 11:38:19 GMT

> the use of these forms seems to have limitations in that there aren't any other forms that can be used for the event before that, but instead, the same above modal forms must be used.

I agree that there are not many levels in the past that you can expreess when using "have" with the modals, but your last sentence is awful. Find something better in the literature and come back.

Re: subjunctive or past conditional

Goodman — Mon, 07 May 2007 23:03:25 GMT

Hi Bokeh,

Becasue of your reply, it made me take a second look at the original question. I also did some research and found this paper written on the subject of Semantic Composition of Subjunctive Conditionals by Michela Ippolito of MIT/TÃ¼bingen University. I am not completely sure if I understood all thwt he wrote, but I do agree whole-heartedly with his view from what I understood. It's obvious that there are several subjunctive moods and conditionals discussed in great legnth which was exactly the reason causing the confusions on this thread. I find it absoulutely useful so I've extracted a small portion which I beleive was related the posted question.

http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=type+of+subjunctive

michela@alum.mit.edu

3. The Semantic Analysis of Subjunctive Conditionals

In answering the question of what the correct semantic analysis of subjunctive

conditionals is we will raise and answer the following questions too: (1) What is the

difference between indicative an subjunctive conditionals? (2) What is the role of the

past morphology in the composition of the meaning of a subjunctive conditional? (3)

What is the contribution of the second layer of past to the meaning of subjunctive

conditionals? As Iatridou observes, the past morphology in subjunctive conditionals is

not interpreted temporally, as the event of playing baseball in example (2) is supposed

to take place in the future (tomorrow). What follows in this paper is inspired by her

work and by the intuition behind it, i.e. that the temporal morphology we see in modal

constructions actively contributes to the construction of the modal meaning. However,

I depart from her idea that tense morphology has a âcore meaningâ that can apply to

different kinds of entities (i.e. her idea that if it applies to times, it is interpreted

temporally; if it applies to worlds, then it is interpreted modally). My claim is that

tense (aspectual) morphology has a single, definite interpretation: the temporal

(aspectual) one. The way tense morphology contributes to the composition of modal

meaning is by being interpreted in different positions in the structure of a modal

sentence, i.e. either in the restriction or in the nuclear scope of the modal operator.

Recall that I am arguing that accessibility relations are of type <s<i<st>> (where i is

the type for times and s the type for worlds): the notion of accessible world is relative

not only to a world but also to a time so that a world will be accessible if it satisfies

certain conditions with respect to an evaluation world and an evaluation time. The

past that we see in subjunctive conditionals such as If Charlie played baseball

tomorrow, we would lose the game is the morphological realization of a perfect

operator interpreted in the modal domain. I will develop an analysis of the meaning of

subjunctive conditionals and show how it solves the puzzle of the presupposition

projection for subjunctive conditionals discussed in Heim 1992; finally, I will answer

the three questions I raised above.

3.1 Felicity Conditions for Conditionals

Recall what the puzzle was. The antecedent of a subjunctive conditional can be

inconsistent with the common ground, and consequently, the set of worlds the modal

operator quantifies over cannot be restricted to the worlds in the context set (the

epistemically accessible worlds) (see (19) below). Furthermore, this set cannot be the

empty context (W) either because, if it were, we would expect conditionals with

antecedents with presuppositions to be infelicitous since the modal base does not have

the right entailments. However, this is incorrect: subjunctive conditionals whose

antecedents have presuppositions are felicitous, which means that the antecedentâs

presuppositions can be entailed by the modal base (cf. (20)). In fact, they must (cf.

(21)).

(19) Jack is dead. If he were alive, he would come to the ceremony.

(20) Jack smokes. If he quit smoking tomorrow, which he wonât, he would run

the marathon.

(21) Jack quit smoking last year. If he quit smoking tomorrow, he would run

the marathon.

Heim 1992 concluded that the only way to reconcile these two requirements of

subjunctive conditionals is to stipulate that the modal base is neither the set of

epistemically accessible worlds (the main context) nor the totally empty modal base

W, but the (largest) set of worlds obtained by suspending all the speakerâs

assumptions except the presuppositions of the antecedent, which then remain entailed.

However, I showed above that this stipulation does not work for all subjunctive

conditionals: in particular, it does not account for the difference between one-past

subjunctive conditionals and mismatched two-pasts subjunctive conditionals, as

shown below.

(22) Jack died last year.

a. #If he came to the ceremony tomorrow, he would be proud of Sally.

b. If he had come to the graduation tomorrow, he would have been proud

of Sally.

We are back where we were: how is the set of worlds to which modal operators apply

selected? Clearly, the felicity conditions for indicative, one-past and two-pasts

subjunctive conditionals are all different. But what is the difference and how is the

difference determined?

It seems correct to hold that for a sentence to be felicitously uttered in the

context c, c must entail the presuppositions of . In the common ground theory of

presuppositions developed by Stalnaker (1973, 1974, 1975), the common ground is

the set of all the propositions known or assumed to be true by all the participants in

the conversation, and the context set is the set of worlds where all the propositions in

the common ground are true. Assertions are meant to update the common ground. If

the assertion is made and accepted, the common ground expands and the context set

shrinks. Thus, if a sentence presupposes p, then asserting requires that the

common ground entail p, i.e. it requires that the speaker assume that it is true in the

common ground that p, modulo accommodation.10 It is explicit in Heimâs context

change semantics (and implicit in Stalnakerâs idea of a derived context) that a clause

(that is to say, the structural description of a clause at the level of Logical Form) is not

always evaluated with respect to the context of utterance: the context with respect to

which a structure is evaluated depends on the level of embedding of the clause, the

most unembedded clause being interpreted with respect to the main (utterance)

context. We can then reformulate the principle above: what is responsible for the

felicity of a sentence is not whether its presuppositions are entailed by the utterance

context but whether they are entailed by the evaluation context (which may be

identical to the utterance time in some cases). Call this principle PREP.

10 Stalnaker (1972, 1973, 1974, 1978, 1988, 1998). Kartunnen (1974), Lewis (1979), Heim (1982,

1983, 1992), Thomason (1990) and von Fintel (2000) also contributed important work in the tradition

of the common ground theory of presuppositions.

3.2 What Looks Like Past is Perfect

I propose that the past morphology we see in subjunctive conditionals in English is

the morphological realization of a perfect operator. The English perfect, and

especially the present perfect, has raised a lot of interest in the linguistic literature

because of the properties that distinguish it from both the present and the simple past

tense. McCoard (1978) offers a survey of possible theories of the perfect: the current

relevance theory, the indefinite past theory, the embedded past theory and, finally, the

theory that he argues to be the best, the Extended Now theory. Very briefly, according

11 The claim that the presuppositions of the antecedent of a conditional have to be entailed by the

context is a standard claim of a dynamic approach to meaning (Heim 1992). However, we will see later

that the issue is more intricate and I will have more to say on this topic later on in the paper.

Statement of Purpose in Food Science: correct me plz

Retsiger — Fri, 23 Feb 2007 19:47:17 GMT

Dear forum

I'm new here, finding this forum while searching for some paraphrases that are used in my Statement of Purpose (SoP), while applying for a PhD in Food Science.

Then, I am lucky to find this forum, and I post my SoP here with the hope that someone, probably with a same interest, may read with me and point out some flaws in my writing. I am not a native speaker so feel free to correct me.

Thanks alot for your time.

===============================================================================

Objective:

Having had opportunity to do research in both academic and industrial institutions, I have acquired the ability to demonstrate strong professionalism, competence, and interest in flavour chemistry, food structure and sensory analysis. Being prepared for further development, I wish to do a thesis in Food Science at the School of â¦.

Scientific background:

After graduation from âXYZ University of Technologyâ, Country X in Food Technology, I pursued the master in Food Science at XYZ, Country Y. Despite the fact that there were some main subjects I had not the opportunity to learn in Country X such as molecular biology and neurology, my performance on the theoretical examination was very satisfactory. Especially, through my diploma work entitled âInfluence of texture on the release of taste compounds while chewing cheese productsâ [1, 2], I have acquired a good knowledge and technical skills on the release of sodium and saltiness perception during food consumption. This work did lead me into the flavour research, a fascinating area which incorporates different aspects, from food ingredients and structure to their interaction with consumers and finally to understand food choice and acceptance.

With a perspective to strengthen my scientific competences, I challenged myself afterward in an industrial research environment, Research Centre ABC where I have been working on an interdisciplinary applied project entitled âMulti-modal mechanisms of fat perceptionâ as a research assistant. The project aims at understanding the principles and rules governing fat perception and covers studies on psychology, physiology and perceptual aspects. I involved into three out of six research themes of the project, including:

(1) Assessing the textural attributes affected byâ¦.. [3]

(2) Investigating whether there is a â¦.. [4, 5]

(3) Characterizing the release of â¦â¦..

From March 2006 to present, I have been focusing on the third theme, in which I have responsibility to do literature research, propose scientific questions, design and run experiments , and finally to delivery results. I have chance not only to reinforce my skills in sensory analysis, but also to take up the most powerful technique to analyze online aroma release, ABCDE (Project name). Besides, studying on different food models, from simple emulsion, isamulsion (a self-assembly structure), double emulsion to applied products, such as MNPQ sauce and mayonnaise, did give me a good understanding on food structure. In this activity, I have obtained very impressing results on isamulsion that may open some applications in food service and culinary. These findings are going to be patented in May 2007 and a scientific article is also under preparation [7].

Furthermore, I attended many scientific seminars, mini-symposiums frequently organized at Research Centre ABC, training courses (Course A, B, C), and particularly Workshop XYZ 2005 . That really helped me to get a larger view on research of Food Science. Finally, the most precious experiences I have actually gained through my time at Research Centre ABC are communication skills, the ability to manage research activity, a practical and critical mind in doing research.

Target project:

I am highly interested in the project entitled âABCDEFGHIKâ proposed by Dr. SomeOne, aiming to develop and demonstrate advanced technologies that allow up to XYZ% salt reduction in processed foods. With good skills in languages including English and French, strong background that meets the needs of project framework, I am confident to be a strong candidate for the position. Together with this personal statement, I enclosed a detailed proposal for this project.

References:

[1] Reference 1 (my paper/report)

[2] Reference 2 (my paper/report)

[3] Reference 3 (my paper/report)

[4] Reference 4 (my paper/report)

[5] Reference 5 (my paper/report)

Reference 6 (my paper/report)

[7] Reference 7 (my paper/report)

Reference 8 (my paper/report)

===============================================================================

Re: What I mean by "meaning".

Anonymous — Fri, 29 Sep 2006 18:21:04 GMT

Well, perhaps this is a more general question than the one I posed in the thread "Modality and meaning" it is important to get this basic question sorted. I don't think it is as simple as it appears.

The study of meaning is known as semantics, and there seems to be a lot of literature on it yet most does not seem to address the basic question of just what meaning is.

To me, meaning is anything that can be fitted into the sentence:
x means y.

The problem with this is that not everything we communicate can be defined in this way. Particularly modal verbs.

Re: Linguistics

Philip — Sun, 16 Jul 2006 15:24:34 GMT

Anonymous wrote:
Hi everybody,
I'm writing my PhD on modal verbs and semi-modal verbs. I am right now lookin at strong obligation - i.e. the area covered by MUST, HAVE TO and HAVE GOT TO. I've come across the distinction between internal and external obligation a lot of times but I'd like to have a reference for it - does anybody know where this distinction is made in the literature?
best
Monika

Sorry I cannot answer your question, but I would be leary of any source that approved the above as anything other than "casual" to "sloppy".

Linguistics

Anonymous — Sat, 15 Jul 2006 09:23:17 GMT

Hi everybody,
I'm writing my PhD on modal verbs and semi-modal verbs. I am right now lookin at strong obligation - i.e. the area covered by MUST, HAVE TO and HAVE GOT TO. I've come across the distinction between internal and external obligation a lot of times but I'd like to have a reference for it - does anybody know where this distinction is made in the literature?
best
Monika

Re: "has to" as a helping verb?

CalifJim — Wed, 15 Feb 2006 05:58:51 GMT

Yes, you're right. Apparently we do have different understandings of objective and subjective. But look at the bright side: We agree that the sentences do not illustrate deontic usage!

On this whole topic I am in basic agreement with John Lyons, who, to say it as briefly as possible, proceeds (in Semantics) as follows.

First, he gives definitions of terms and examples of an epistemic and a deontic reading of a sentence, to introduce the topic. Then he says, "Various terms have been used by linguists to distinguish [the epistemic reading] from [the deontic reading]. Kurylowicz (1964) would say that [the epistemic reading] involves subjectivity (i.e., the expression of the speaker's attitude), whereas [the deontic reading] does not."

Lyons then says that he will draw a distinction between subjective and objective epistemic modality. And that "when we take up the discussion of deontic modality, we shall see that a similar distinction can also be drawn between subjective and objective deontic modality." A little later in the discussion, he summarizes with "The fact that both epistemic and deontic modality can be interpreted either subjectively or objectively means that Kurylowicz's account of the distinction between epistemic and deontic modality cannot be correct, ..."

Actually, I'm not particularly interested in whether Kurylowicz is correct or not. I'm interested more in the fact that the linguistics experts disagree about how terms like "subjective" and "objective" apply to modality. When there is no uniform approach agreed to in the literature, and when some authors, like Lyons, see the subjective/objective polarity applying to both epistemic and deontic modality, then I conclude for myself personally that the use of the terms "subjective" and "objective" are not likely to advance the cause of students' understanding of modal verbs. I consciously avoid such terminology when discussing modals with students. I do like "epistemic" and "deontic", however, and there is much more agreement in the literature about what these terms mean. But even then, I use the words "modals of logic" and "modals of social interaction" instead of the fancy theoretical terms when speaking to students about these verbs.

CJ
PS. It's not necessary to quote everything in every previous post of the thread before responding!

WEAKLY CONSTRAINED MODALS - "may" as expressing probability and possibility

Trentdougherty — Sat, 23 Jul 2005 03:18:47 GMT

Overview: outsiders seeks help of linguists
part one: the set up
part two: the questions

I am a graduate student in philosophy investigating what we call "epistemic possibility". Sentence express this modality when they assert that something is possible relative to some epistemic category such as belief, knowledge, or evidence. Standard examples would be such as the following.

(1) It might rain tomorrow.

(2) The package may contain a bomb.

(3) My answer could be wrong.

The standard philosophical account of epistemic possibility is formalized in a Kripke semantics. The basic idea behind one standard version is that a proposition is epistemically possible for me if it's negation is not entailed by anything that I know (technically this only covers contingent propositions; necessary propositions require a caveat). This has led to countless problems and misunderstandings.

II.

I think the most natural analysis of sentences one through three above is in terms of probability. I make probability the theoretical anchor and defined possibility in terms of it. Epistemic possibility is non-negligible probability. The threshold of negligibility will be sensitive to context. That is, it will vary depending upon the particulars of the situation.

I have been unable to find much on modals, but what I have found suggests that it is fairly well accepted in the linguistics community that the subjunctive often expresses probability judgments. So I have a few questions for you specialists out there.

1. Is my impression stated just above correct?

2. Do linguists sharply divide possibility in probability?

3. Could you please point me to some standard authoritative reference work which I could consult in this matter?

4. Are there any online resources which could provide me with a perspective of the state of the literature on modals and probability?

I would greatly appreciate any help anyone could offer in this matter. I'm afraid philosophers still aren't adequately in tune with empirical research in this matter. I'm seeking to correct that.

PS - I have a broken wrist, so I am dictating this with voice recognition software. I apologize in advance if I have missed any errors due to phonetic resemblance.

Re: Nuances between Modals

CalifJim — Wed, 09 Mar 2005 03:41:13 GMT

1) Do May / Might NOT (like CANNOT) express an interdiction = must not ?

ex: ?
["may not" and "cannot" and "must not" can be used to forbid, but not "might not" and "could not".

You [may not / cannot / must not / *might not / *could not] begin the exam before you are given the signal.

"could not", and less convincingly, "might not", can be used to report an act of forbidding in a subordinate clause. I would avoid "might not" in this context. It is too ambiguous in modern English, but you might find it in older literature with this meaning.

We were told that we [could not / ?might not] begin the exam before we were given the signal.]

2) Mrs James is in hospital and HASNâT BEEN ALLOWED TO have (and NOT âcould haveâ) a cigarette after her meals. (correct ?) [Yes. Or "is not allowed to have a ...]

3) What's the difference between possibility and probability ?

a) probability = near-certainty, action likely to happen;
b) possibility = doubtful situation, action less likely to happen ?
[If an action is possible, it just means that nothing is stopping it from happening, nothing physical and nothing logical. It says nothing about how likely (probable) it is that it will happen. It may happen once every 5000 years or it may happen once an hour. It may be an event that is very likely to happen or very unlikely to happen. The point is that it has some liklihood (big or small) of happening. It's possible.
If an action is probable, in my opinion it has better than a 50-50 chance of happening. We estimate that it is more likely than not to occur.]

4) In the following examples is the verb in the âing form considered a present continuous tense or a gerund? [I don't know. I suspect that it will depend on which reference you consult. I would consider it a present continuous tense.]

a) âWhere is John?â
âI don't know. He may BE READING in his room.
He may BE WAITING at the station.â

b) Where is John? I don't know. He may BE COMING tonight.

4) What does âCOULD + Bare infinitiveâ express ? Is it the same as âwould be able toâ (= present conditional) ? Should an if-clause be always be implied ?

ex: a) Iâm sure you COULD GET into university. = unrealized past action ? [No.] i.e. you were capable of / it was possible for you to enter university but you didnât ?? [No.] [It means, "I'm sure that you would be able to get into ... (if you tried / if you wanted to / etc.)"]

b) Iâm sure you COULD HAVE GOT into university. (correct sentence ? meaning ) [Correct. I'm sure that you would have been able to get into ... (if you had tried / etc.) (but we know that you didn't)]

c) Iâm sure you COULD get / WOULD BE ABLE TO get into university, if you applied. = improbable action in the present or future ? [Not improbable. Not to me, anyway. Especially with "I'm sure", which indicates certainty, of course.]

d) Iâm sure you COULD HAVE GOT / WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO get into university, if you had applied. = unreal past action ? [Yes. "Counterfactual".]

- Whatâs the difference between a) and c) then between b) and d)? [The difference is whether the condition expressed in the "if"-clause is implicit or explicit.]

5)a) A: That crime canât/could have been committed by my brother; he was abroad with his
wife at the time. [Either is OK.]

B: You MAY believe me. / You CAN believe me. (difference ?)

[With "may" there are two readings: 1. "It is possible that you [do/will] believe me", AND 2. literally, "You are permitted to believe me" -- but with the idiomatic meaning "I assure you that I am speaking the truth" / "Rest assured that you would not be wrong to believe/trust me". Of the two, I find the second reading a bit strained. The second reading belongs more properly, in my opinion, to "You can believe me."
With "can" there are also two readings that come to mind. 1. "It's up to you to decide whether you want to believe me (or not)". 2. "I assure you that I am speaking the truth" and all the others mentioned above for "may".
A lot of the interpretation will depend on context and even tone of voice and phrasing.]

You MAY be right (perhaps you are right, perhaps not) / You CAN be right (possible / correct ?)
[You [may, might, could] be right. I find it extremely difficult to contextualize "You can be right" in any but the most strained readings. I'd say it's just not used in the meaning you're thinking of. Still, there's " Everything is in flux. Circumstances are constantly changing. You can be right in the morning and wrong in the afternoon.]

b) He begins to wonder if the man might be some sort of a lunatic. (correct sentence?) [No, but not because of the modal. It should be, "He's beginning to wonder if the man might be ..."]
c) He began to wonder if the man might be some sort of a lunatic. [Correct.](difference with b) ?) [Just the obvious change of tense in the main clause.]

[The paraphrases are:

He is beginning to wonder if it is possible that the man is some sort of lunatic.
He began to wonder if it was possible that the man was some sort of lunatic. ]

CJ

Re: Latin or German? Which languages has influenced English more?

CalifJim — Thu, 09 Dec 2004 07:38:34 GMT

You and your classmate don't seem to have any standard by which both of you agree to measure influence. Will it be the number of words related to each? Will it be the most frequently used words? The most frequently used words in everyday conversation? The most frequently used words in formal writing? In literature? Will your standard not have anything to do with word counts? Will you measure influence by similarity of syntax and morphology? Which syntactic structures will you measure? Phrasal verbs? Verb position within the sentence? The system of verb tenses?

I don't think it will be possible ever to reach an agreement on all these and hundreds of other issues. There is no objective standard of what "influence" consists of in this context.

The tense system, the modal verb system, and the phrasal verbs all point to Germanic elements as the infrastructure of English. Most of our everyday words are related to German. Nevertheless, we have more words related to the Romance languages, originally borrowed through French, than words with Germanic roots.

I suppose, in the absence of any rigorous standards and accurate data to answer the question, I personally would argue that German did not, strictly speaking, influence English, because English is the natural historic outgrowth of a branch of German itself. We don't normally use the word "influence" in that sense. If English already existed apart from German and then came in contact with German and absorbed some of its characteristics, then I might use the word "influence". I would say that French, as a superposition of French vocabulary upon a Germanic substructure, fulfills the role of "influence" much better. [Direct borrowings from Latin (not through French) are fewer and mostly related to church terminology.]

California Jim