Search results for 'tag:Translation tag:Predicates' matching tags 'Translation' and 'Predicates'

Re:

muratsekerci — Sun, 12 Jun 2005 04:48:05 GMT

Thanks Roro and thanks LanguageLover..

Roro your wonderful answers expands my knowledge and imagination.

i liked this consultation and i want to continue (if you want),

LanguageLover, we will be glad if you tell your ideas about solutions.

and new questions and my answers: (i am waiting your interpretations...)

Question 1: Translate the following sentence into predicate logic in a way that captures the constraint that there is a unique dog in the universe of individuals:

âThe dog chased John.â

Answer:

?P?x(?y(DOG(y)?x=y)? P(x))?CHASE(x,John)

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Question 2 :Do a complete syntactic and semantic derivation (i.e. translation) of the sentence âJohn believes that a man or a woman walksâ that will give âa manâ a 'de dicto' reading while âa womanâ receives a 'de re' reading

Answer :

Believe(John, Ë?x(Man(x) ? Walk(x))) V ?y(Woman(y) ? Believe(John, Ë(walk(y)))

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Question 3:

We have suggested that no distinction should be made between subjects and objects when truth-conditionally evaluating sentences. Consider, however, pairs of sentences like the following:

(a) The King of France is bald.
(b) I saw the King of France in an exhibition yesterday.

While "b" could be straightforwardly evaluated as false, whether the same would be so easily said about "a" is controversial. "a" could be treated either as false or undefined. Briefly discuss the issue in terms of the subject-object asymmetry/symmetry and two-valued logic

Answer :
if the king of friend is not a member of the set of bald then we can say "a" is false.

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Question 4:

Discuss the Russellian way of avoiding paradoxes (i.e. via a system types) in terms of its applicability to natural language.

Answer :

i have't got a good idea..

Re: Help Please!

Roro — Thu, 09 Jun 2005 20:16:14 GMT

Hello muratsekerci, and welcome to EnglishForum.

Question 1: Which of the following designate a legitimate type according to the type system which our language Ltype rests on?

I'm not sure what means here, because these logical types are a bit unusual. But as far as I know:

a. , , t>> ... a function from type to type , t>. That is, a function from [one-place first-order predicates] to [second-order predicates].

b. , t>, > ... a function from type , t> to type . That is, a function from [second-order predicates] to [one-place first-order predicates].

c. , , t> ... meaningless as it stands

d. , t>> ... a function from type t to type , t>. That is, a function from [truth values] to [second-order predicates].

e. , > ... meaningless as it stands

Questin 2: âThe dog chased John.â
Derive the semantic value of the determiner the as a higher-order expression from the translation of the sentence above abstracting away the semantic contributions of the other expressions constituting the sentence step by step.

Before answering your question I'd like to ask you: in what kind of logical language? Intensional?

Question 3: Suppose the following rules were added to the syntax of L1E:
VP -> Vs S
Vs -> believes-that, hopes-that
What type of semantic value would be appropriate in an extensional framework for verbs belonging to the lexical category Vs? What difficulty arises in attempting to formulate the semantic rule for Vs + S constructions

First of all they are not syntactic rule, aren't they?
In Montague Grammar (which is not extensional framework, but the basics are the same) these expressions like are considered: ,>. If you want a semantic value in an extensional framework, > would be appropriate, I think.

And as to the difficulty, does your teacher demand some concrete answer? There're a lot of problems (for me at least).

We still have time until Wednesday. We are waiting your post. Please explain your question more in detail.

Re: Montague Grammar

Roro — Sun, 05 Jun 2005 15:11:50 GMT

Hello, rvw. I'd like to add just a few words.
I remember reading in Gamut1991 roughly such an exciting passage:

G.W. Leibniz (1646-1716) had proposed a program for logic and developed ideas of a universal language, in which thought could be represented directly, without any of the ambiguities. Frege's predicate logic is a more powerful language system, and Montague Grammar is a much more productive paradigm which can give a semantics for natural language. (This is a very rough paraphrase ... I cannot find the exact place in Gamut now...)

And I think ... a truth-conditional semantics which is based on a model is similar to an axiomatic corollary in mathematics. ( I haven't got any conformation, maybe there's inaccuracy in my expression.)
======================================================================
Here's another translation of tanka:

Ever since I placed
a yellow birdcage beside
the open window,
I keep imagining that
some bird will come and live there.

Trinity isn't a Biblical teaching. It's heresy.

southafrica — Thu, 23 Oct 2003 16:20:12 GMT

AT JOHN 1:1 the King James Version reads: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God." Trinitarians claim that this means that "the Word" (Greek, ho lo'gos) who came to earth as Jesus Christ was Almighty God himself.

Someone who is "with" another person cannot also be that other person

Note, however, that here again the context lays the groundwork for accurate understanding. Even the King James Version says, "The Word was with God." (Italics ours.) Someone who is "with" another person cannot be the same as that other person. In agreement with this, the Journal of Biblical Literature, edited by Jesuit Joseph A. Fitzmyer, notes that if the latter part of John 1:1 were interpreted to mean "the" God, this "would then contradict the preceding clause," which says that the Word was with God.

Notice, too, how other translations render this part of the verse:

1808: "and the word was a god." The New Testament in an Improved Version, Upon the Basis of Archbishop Newcome's New Translation: With a Corrected Text.

1864: "and a god was the word." The Emphatic Diaglott, interlinear reading, by Benjamin Wilson.

1928: "and the Word was a divine being." La Bible du Centenaire, L'Evangile selon Jean, by Maurice Goguel.

1935: "and the Word was divine." The BibleâAn American Translation, by J. M. P. Smith and E. J. Goodspeed.

1946: "and of a divine kind was the Word." Das Neue Testament, by Ludwig Thimme.

1950: "and the Word was a god." New World Translation of the Christian Greek Scriptures.

1958: "and the Word was a God." The New Testament, by James L. Tomanek.

1975: "and a god (or, of a divine kind) was the Word." Das Evangelium nach Johannes, by Siegfried Schulz.

1978: "and godlike kind was the Logos." Das Evangelium nach Johannes, by Johannes Schneider.

At John 1:1 there are two occurrences of the Greek noun theÂ·os' (god). The first occurrence refers to Almighty God, with whom the Word was ("and the Word [lo'gos] was with God [a form of theÂ·os']"). This first theÂ·os' is preceded by the word ton (the), a form of the Greek definite article that points to a distinct identity, in this case Almighty God ("and the Word was with [the] God").

On the other hand, there is no article before the second theÂ·os' at John 1:1. So a literal translation would read, "and god was the Word." Yet we have seen that many translations render this second theÂ·os' (a predicate noun) as "divine," "godlike," or "a god." On what authority do they do this?

The Koine Greek language had a definite article ("the"), but it did not have an indefinite article ("a" or "an"). So when a predicate noun is not preceded by the definite article, it may be indefinite, depending on the context.

The Journal of Biblical Literature says that expressions "with an anarthrous [no article] predicate preceding the verb, are primarily qualitative in meaning." As the Journal notes, this indicates that the lo'gos can be likened to a god. It also says of John 1:1: "The qualitative force of the predicate is so prominent that the noun [theÂ·os'] cannot be regarded as definite."

So John 1:1 highlights the quality of the Word, that he was "divine," "godlike," "a god," but not Almighty God. This harmonizes with the rest of the Bible, which shows that Jesus, here called "the Word" in his role as God's Spokesman, was an obedient subordinate sent to earth by his Superior, Almighty God.

There are many other Bible verses in which almost all translators in other languages consistently insert the article "a" when translating Greek sentences with the same structure. For example, at Mark 6:49, when the disciples saw Jesus walking on water, the King James Version says: "They supposed it had been a spirit." In the Koine Greek, there is no "a" before "spirit." But almost all translations in other languages add an "a" in order to make the rendering fit the context. In the same way, since John 1:1 shows that the Word was with God, he could not be God but was "a god," or "divine."

Joseph Henry Thayer, a theologian and scholar who worked on the American Standard Version, stated simply: "The Logos was divine, not the divine Being himself." And Jesuit John L. McKenzie wrote in his Dictionary of the Bible: "Jn 1:1 should rigorously be translated . . . 'the word was a divine being.'"