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1) "Although the affirmation that science does not describe the world as it is in itself does not entail the abandonment of moral skepticism, the claim that both morality and science are faulty necessarily presupposes the possession of some view of the world which is not called into question. For to affirm that moral and scientific entities do not exist in the objective world, it is indeed necessary to possess some kind of knowledge about what entities do form part of that world."

2) "To sum up: one can deny the existence of objective moral values without having to be skeptical only about morality or non-skeptical about science; but this denial necessarily presupposes confidence in the objectivity of some view of the world with which moral realism is at odds. Hence, Annas is right when she maintains that modern moral skepticism is essentially local".

3) "On the contrary, the modern moral skeptic does believe that the arguments put forward against the existence of objective moral values are stronger than those which purport to prove their existence. That is to say, he does not suspend judgment because he thinks there are sufficient grounds for denying the objectivity of morality. This attitude (thought?) can only be explained by the fact that he believes he knows what reality is really like and, then, what there is and what there is not in the objective world."

Thanks.
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Hello Sextus

Maybe:

1) "Although the affirmation that science does not describe the world as it is in itself does not entail the abandonment of moral skepticism, the claim that both morality and science are faulty [?imperfect] necessarily presupposes the possession of some view of the world which is not called into question [?which is not itself considered imperfect]. For to affirm that moral and scientific entities do not exist in the objective world, it is indeed necessary to possess some kind of knowledge about what entities do form part of that world."

3) "On the contrary, the modern moral skeptic does believe that the arguments put forward against the existence of objective moral values are stronger than those which purport to prove their existence. That is to say, he does not suspend judgment [insert comma?] because he thinks there are sufficient grounds for denying the objectivity of morality. This attitude (thought?) [attitude, I think] can only be explained by the fact that he believes he knows what reality is really like [in the underlined part, i'm not sure I grasp the meaning; do you have a paraphrase?] and, then, what there is and what there is not in the objective world [and furthermore, what does and does not exist in the objective world]."

See you,

MrP
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Ok, perfect, with these remarks I think I've got it. Thanks.